Scientists behind Armageddon flu virus suspend research because it ‘could put the world at risk for a catastrophic pandemic’
Scientists behind Armageddon flu virus suspend research because it ‘could put the world at risk for a catastrophic pandemic’
Suspension: Ron Fouchier is among a team of scientists who abandoned their controversial avian flu studies
Researchers studying a potentially deadlier, airborne version of bird flu have suspended their studies over concerns that the mutated virus they created could be used as a devastating form of bioterrorism or accidentally escape the lab.
In a letter published Friday in the journals Nature and Science, 39 scientists defended the research as critical to public health efforts.
But they are bowing to the fear that has become widespread since media reports in December revolved around the investigations and their possible consequences.
It was feared that the engineered viruses could escape the labs — similar to the terrifying scenario in the 1971 sci-fi film The Andromeda Strain — or possibly be used to create a bioterror weapon.
The scientists who signed the letter included leaders of the two teams leading the study, at Erasmus Medical College in the Netherlands and the University of Wisconsin, Madison, as well as flu experts at institutions ranging from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention at the University of Hong Kong.
For the full letter, see below or click HERE.
Fears: Concerns that avian flu could escape labs and cause a pandemic or be used in bioterrorism have led to research halts
The decision to suspend the study for 60 days “was completely voluntary,” Erasmus virologist Ron Fouchier told Reuters.
The pause in their is intended to allow global health agencies and governments to weigh the benefits of the research and agree on ways to minimize the risk.
“It’s the right thing to do given the controversies in the US,” Fouchier said.
Terror: If it escaped, the mutated virus created by scientists could cause global disaster
The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity had asked Science and Nature in December to censor details of the research submitted for publication by the Erasmus and Wisconsin teams.
Biosafety experts fear that a form of the virus transmitted through airborne droplets — which the Erasmus and Wisconsin teams created independently — could cause a pandemic worse than the 1918-19 Spanish flu outbreak, which until 40 million people died.
“There’s clearly a controversy here about the proper balance of risk and benefit,” said University of Maryland virologist Daniel Perez, who signed the letter in support of the moratorium.
“I’m convinced this investigation should continue, but that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t call a time-out.”
The full open letter
Below is the full open letter from Ron AM Fouchier, Adolfo García-Sastre, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, and 36 co-authors published Friday in the journals Nature and Science.
“The ongoing threat of a flu pandemic is one of the greatest public health challenges. Influenza pandemics are known to be caused by viruses that evolve from animal reservoirs, such as birds and pigs, and can undergo genetic changes that increase their transmission capacity to humans. Pandemic preparedness plans have been implemented worldwide to mitigate the impact of flu pandemics.
A major obstacle to preventing flu pandemics is that little is known about what makes a flu virus transmissible to humans. Consequently, the potential pandemic risk associated with the many different flu viruses in animals cannot be assessed with any certainty.
Recent research breakthroughs identified specific determinants of H5N1 influenza virus transmission in ferrets. Responsible research on flu virus transmission using various animal models is conducted by multiple laboratories around the world, adopting the highest international standards for biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory. These standards are regulated and closely monitored by the relevant authorities. This statement is made by the principal investigators of these laboratories.
In two independent studies conducted in two leading flu laboratories at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Erasmus MC in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, researchers have proven that viruses containing a hemagglutinin (HA) protein from highly pathogenic avian flu viruses H5N1 can become transmissible to ferrets. .
This is crucial information that advances our understanding of flu transmission. However, more research is needed to determine how influenza viruses become human pandemic threats in nature, so that they can be contained before they acquire the ability to transmit from person to person, or so that appropriate countermeasures can be implemented as a human adaptation takes place.
Despite the positive public health benefits these studies sought to provide, the perceived fear that the ferret-transmitted H5 HA viruses could escape the labs has led to intense public debate in the media about the benefits and potential harms of this type of research. We want to assure the public that these experiments have been conducted with appropriate regulatory oversight in safe containment facilities by highly trained and responsible personnel to minimize any risk of accidental release. Whether the flu viruses adapted to ferrets have the ability to transmit from human to human cannot be tested.
We recognize that we and the rest of the scientific community must clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize the potential risks. We propose doing this in an international forum where the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues. We realize that organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that arise from work.
To allow time for these discussions, we have agreed to a voluntary 60-day pause for any study involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals. In addition, during this period no experiments will be conducted with live H5N1 or H5 HA reassortant viruses that have already been shown to be transmissible to ferrets. We will continue to assess the transmissibility of H5N1 flu viruses that emerge in nature and pose a continuing threat to human health.”
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